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DISOBEDIENCE AND COERCIVE CONTEMPT
CONFINEMENT: THE TERMINALLY STUBBORN
CONTEMNOR
DOUG RENiDLEMAN*
INTRODUCTION

Cora and Fred were divorced after having been married only three
years. Communication had broken down completely; the dominant emotion
was fury. Cora was pregnant when Judge Row granted the divorce. Four
months after the divorce, Cora gave birth to a daughter, Heather. Bitter
custody litigation began two years later. Judge Row grants Fred unsupervised
custody of Heather for one weekend each month. Cora does not produce
Heather.
This article examines coercive contempt confinement growing out of
Cora's violation of Judge Row's order to produce Heather. Its purpose is
to test coercive contempt confinement in the crucible of disobedience. A
preliminary inquiry examines the process developed by courts to prevent
erroneous orders that lead to coercive confinement. The principal inquiry
is the way the system responds when a contemnor engages the judge in the
form of civil disobedience I call "terminal stubbornness." When her time
comes round the terminally stubborn contemnor will be released without
obedience. Why capitulate to the recalcitrant? How should the legal system
structure its surrender?'

* Huntley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee Law School; Director, Frances
Lewis Law Center. Thanks to Uncas McThenia and John McCoid for comments; Chris
Lonsbury for helping with the footnotes; Joe Ulrich for skepticism; and Margaret Williams
for inspiration and zealous support.
1. See 0. Fiss & D. RBNDLm&AN, INuNCTIONS 1084 (2d ed. 1984). This article continues
the discussion of mythical Cassandra and Penelope begun in Injunctions, Chapter 13. This
article attempts to answer and to clarify questions raised in that discussion. Some answers and
clarification emerged from my assistance with judicial and legislative efforts to secure Dr.
Elizabeth Morgan's release. My commentary in the Legal Times on September 12, 1988, began
my participation in Dr. Morgan's case. D. Rendleman, Coercion Stops, Cruelty Begins; Enough
is Enough: Set Dr. Morgan Free, Legal Times, Sept. 12, 1988, at 19. In this article I have
drawn on my statements before the House Committee on the District of Columbia's subcommittee on Judiciary and Education on May 23, 1989 concerning H.R. 2136 and H.R. 2296,
as well as from my testimony to the Senate's Committee on Governmental Affairs's subcommittee on General Services, Federalism, and the District of Columbia on July 21, 1989
concerning S. 1163 and H.R. 2136. See Hearingson H.R. 2136 Before the District of Columbia's
Subcomm. on Judiciary and Education, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 59-109 (1989) (statement of
Doug Rendleman); Hearingson S. 1163 Before the Subcomm. on GeneralServices, Federalism,
and the District of Columbia, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21-25 (1989) (statement of Doug
Rendleman). In the fall of 1989, Piesident Bush's signature on the legislation that emerged
from this process freed Dr. Elizabeth Morgan. Act of Sept. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-97,
1989 U.S. Code & Admin. News (103 Stat.) 633.
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BACKGROUND OF COERCIVE CONTEMPT

The example above is based on Dr. Elizabeth Morgan's legendary
incarceration. 2 The charge of an adult molesting a child points to a crucial
social issue with intractable legal consequences. The contention that a child
has been molested or abused is difficult to prove particularly in a forum
that the contemnor and her sympathizers charge is male-dominated and too
ready to disbelieve credible evidence or to deny that a problem exists.'
In addition, domestic litigation concerning child abuse and custody
issues often involves furious litigants pursuing quests for vengeance, their
domestic wars exacerbated by lawyers and the adversary system into scorched
earth tactics and overkill. 4 An Australian study found that more litigants
breach family court orders than in "any other court of civil jurisdiction."s
The losing spouse in contested matrimonial litigation is often a "bitter and
resentful person" whose "hatred and hostility" means that "a firm deter' 6
mination to disobey the order frequently develops.
Intense feelings lead litigants to flout court orders. The observer cannot
tell whether a sexist conspiracy of denial and dissimulation has wrongfully
martyred the disobedient person or whether common garden hostility and
resentment are spiraling downward toward a worse denouement than anyone
desires. The Australian study, observing that separate acts of disobedience
are part of a larger imbroglio, counsels prudence; judges should eschew
' 7
contempt measures except as a "last resort.
Judge Row's hypothetical dilemma above involved contempt measures,
but judges may prefer damages litigation to solve domestic hostilities.
Suppose Fred exited the family home too rapidly to remember his grandfather's 1873 three-dollar gold coin; litigation ensues. 8 Fred seeks damages
or the coin. A damage judgment in a tort action for conversion leads to
an enforcement mechanism. Typically, the judge will enter a money judgment for the "value" of the coin, $1500.9
Fred, the judgment creditor, will collect the money judgment from
Cora's generl assets through judgment lien, execution, or garnishment. The
authorities will sell Cora's other property and turn the proceeds over to
Fred. If Cora has no property or if her property is exempt under state law,

2. See Harmer, Limiting Incarceration for Civil Contempt in Child Custody Cases, 4
B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 239 (1990).
3. See Baltimore City Dept. of Social Serv. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990)
(involving investigation of intra-family violence); King v. Department of Social & Health Serv.,
110 Wash. 2d 793, 795, 756 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (noting abuse suffered by children of
parents jailed for contempt because of parents' refusal to reveal location of son).
4. See In re Marriage of Greene, 711 S.W.2d 557, 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
5. Chesterman & Waters, Contempt and the Disobedying Spouse, 8 U.N.S.W. L.J.
106, 107 (1985).
6. Id. at 115.
7. Id. at 136.
8. See Moody v. Smith, 899 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1990).
9. See id.at 386.

1991]

THE TERMINALLY STUBBORN CONTEMNOR

Fred's judgment will remain unsatisfied until it is paid or until the statute
of limitations runs. The money judgment collection process is impersonal,
and Cora herself owes no duty of obedience. Confining Cora to collect an
unpaid civil money judgment would be interdicted as debt imprisonment.10
If Fred's judgment is for an unintended tort or contract or based on a debt
between the warring spouses, Cora may file bankruptcy and discharge the
thereby avoiding paying the debt from her earnings after
debt completely,
1
bankruptcy. 1
Historically, the legal system was divided into artificial categories called
legal and equitable, legal tried to juries and leading to money damages,
equitable tried to judges without juries leading to personal orders enforced
through contempt. The legal system developed mechanisms to shunt litigants
toward damage remedies. Some areas are exclusively equitable; others are
in the concurrent jurisdiction of law and equity where the principle shunting
mechanism was a rule that denied a claimant a personal or equitable order
unless her injury was irreparable with damages, also stated as unless damages
are inadequate. 12 The inadequacy prerequisite has declined to the point
where one bold researcher has proclaimed it dead.' 3
Two differences remain: in "equity" actions leading to personal orders,
the judge both finds the facts and applies the law, and in the end, he may
use personal or contempt remedies. Family law, the subject of Cora's
travails, remains exclusively equitable. Before deciding the factual and
remedial issues in family law, the judge will not ask the irreparability
question used under concurrent law and equity to sort legal -from equitable.
The coin controversy quickly is converted from a "legal" action for
damages or replevin into an equity proceeding where the plaintiff seeks a
personal order. The coin is too small and easy to conceal for an officer
with a writ of replevin to find. Because a family heirloom is "unique,"
sentimental impairment has occurred. If Fred wants Grampa's coin, not
Cora's money, then Judge Row may find that Fred's damages would be
difficult or impossible to compute and that money damages are inadequate
before entering a personal order telling Cora to produce the coin.' 4 Her
noncompliance may trigger a personal enforcement mechanism, coercive
contempt.
The inadequacy prerequisite never did serve well as a principle of
containment where containment was really needed. Perhaps its "demise"

10. See,. e.g., United States ex rel. Thorn v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that incarceration of defendant with ability to pay debt may continue indefinitely,
but cannot last forever). Supplemental proceedings to enforce the judgment may lead to
confinement if the judge finds that the judgment debtor is able to pay and she refuses to pay.
11. Bankruptcy Code §523 (1990).
12. See Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisitefor an Injunction, 33
U. FLA. L. Rnv. 346 (1981).
13. Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule, 103 HARv. L. Rnv. 688, 692

(1990).
14. See id. at 705-07.
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will lead us to develop discrete policies and rules for personal orders and
injunctions and to grapple directly with the enforcement problems that
preventive, individualized relief creates.
A personal order to Cora to produce Heather (or the coin) raises the
stakes for Cora. Judge Row may confine Cora to "enforce" the personal
order; but he may base that coercive confinement on an incorrect factfinding. In contrast if incorrect factfinding leads to an erroneous money
judgment against Cora, Cora as judgment debtor may lose assets, but not
liberty.
The subject is power. The power of benevolent government on the one
hand to advance its citizens' interests as defined by positive law. The
government power is a specialized kind: juidicial power to grant personal
orders that require litigants' conduct and to imprison recalcitrant litigants
to encourage them to comply with the orders. Personal orders, particularly
injunctions, are the modern court system's great engine of positive government. In an efficient and legitimate government, victors in lawsuits are
entitled to a remedy measured by the substantive right the defendant
impaired. Injunctions are preventive and individualized remedies to protect
citizens' rights that judges cannot compensate with money. The federal civil
rights injunction moved injunctions from the disreputable realm of protecting enterprise against labor into an era in which judges routinely enjoin to
desegregate schools, to reform prisons and mental hospitals, and to protect
the environment. 5
On the other hand is the power of individualism and the human spirit.
The spirit of autonomy is coupled with skepticism about whether judges'
orders are always correct and entitled to respect, whether the government
can ameliorate every problem, and whether a government with that much
strength and hubris creates more risks of abuse than it is worth. A society
committed to preserving individualism and autonomy recognizes a strain of
resistance to authority. "We remember the martyrs who preferred to die
rather than live as apostates with more favor than the government officials
16
who administered the Roman Empire."'
If a judge, to enable a victor to enjoy his rights, orders the loser to do
something, the losing litigant retains some power, the power to decide
whether to cooperate or to gum up the works using a variety of methods:
foot dragging, feigned misunderstandings, requests for clarifications, obfuscation, delay, demands for a series of small concessions, recalcitrance, more
delay, and finally disobedience. Cora has not obeyed. So we enter the
positivist Hobbesian world where the question is less "What is the rule?"
than "What happens to me if I don't?"
We also learn about the difference between formal power and moral
power. Disobedience is a technique available to people who are out of the

15. 0. iss, The Triumph of "Brown", in TH CIVIL RIGHTS INJuNCTIoN 1-6 (1978)
(tracing history and evolution of civil injunction).
16. 0. FRss & D. IENDLmAN, supra' note 1, at 1105-06.
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loop of formal power. The temporal rules let the authorities exact sanctions
for disobedience. The law's claim has to rest on something more than its
agents' ability to coerce. When government authorities are inflexible, the
terminally stubborn person may teach them that weakness is strength. For
legitimacy and principle have often subordinated and even replaced the
17
trappings of formal power.
COERCIVE CONTEMPT: Do

=Hi
ENDs WARRA

THE MEANs?

The possibility that the loser will be recalcitrant haunts the decision to
order conduct in the first place. On one hand, the judge may not express
approbation at leaving the victor's substantive right hostage to the loser's
obduracy. On the other hand is the question: is this substantive right worth
enough to the plaintiff and the system to justify putting the screws down
on the loser?
If an uncooperative loser declines to obey a personal order, the legal
system hands the judge three tools, all labeled contempt, to use. 8 Two
respond to past violation. First, criminal contempt is available to the judge
to punish someone who disobeys. Second, if the defendant's violation has
injured plaintiff, the judge may award plaintiff compensatory contempt,
money to compensate for loss.
Coercive contempt, the principal subject here, is the third form of
contempt.' 9 Coercive contempt is a judicial threat to alter a violator's
incentives to comply with lawful orders and to answer proper questions.
The judge, in an effort to obtain from the loser the conduct the winner is
entitled to, tells the contemnor to obey "or else." If contemnor's obedience
is not forthcoming, the judge may exercise his "or else" option.
In our examples, Judge Row's coercive contempt threats will take the
form of threats to imprison Cora.20 Judges employ coercive confinement as
a last resort to secure the conduct to which the law says the winner is
entitled. In the alternative, a judge may choose to use daily fines for
coercive contempt.
There are several ways to avoid coercive confinement. The contemnor
may comply. In theory coercive confinement is indeterminate; contemnor
controls whether and how long she will be confined, because if she obeys,
the judge will stop or not start the coercion. The familiar slogan about
coercive confinement catches this quality: "You have the keys to the jail
' 21
in your pocket.
17. Cf. D.

LAx & J. SEBENIUS, TER MANAGER AS NEGoTIATOR

242-58 (1986).

18. See 0. Fiss & D. PENDmLAN, supra note 1, at 837; Rendleman, How to Enforce
an Injunction, 10 LrIIoATIoN 23 (1983).
19. See 0. Fiss & D. RNDrmnAN, supra note 1, at 1004-07.
20. Coercive contempt may also consist of judicial threats to fine contemnors, typically

a set amount for each day of disobedience. Staged daily fines may be more or less coercive
than confinement. Compare Dickinson v. United States, 763 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding

fine more coercive than confinement given current imprisonment of contemnor) with In re
Griffin, 677 F. Supp. 26, 28-29 (D. Me. 1988) (holding fine less coercive than confinement).
21. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
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Coercive confinement may terminate without obedience. Plaintiff may
cease to need contemnor's obedience. In our example, the authorities may
find Heather. No one may need contemnor to comply; if someone seeks
their testimony, the action may reach judgment or the grand jury term may
end without it.2" Nothing may remain to coerce; for example striking public
employees were coerced to return to work, but when they were fired, the
measure lost capacity to coerce.?
Coercive confinement has an awesome potential for abuse. Power to
imprison is concentrated in a single trial judge. The usual checks against
abuse that precede criminal imprisonment, including a grand jury indictment,
prosecutorial discretion, a jury trial for a sentence of greater than six
months, the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the opportunity for an executive pardon, are absent before coercive
confinement begins. Contemnor is entitled to a civil form of notice and
hearing only.m In contrast to criminal procedure, the judge may close the
coercive contempt hearing and seal the record? Criminal sentences are for
definite periods. But, in theory, if the coerced individual does not cooperate,
coercive confinement may never end. 6
To examine procedural protections against incorrect coercive confinements, we tufn to the following scene in the courtroom. After Judge Row
grants Fred custody, Fred subpoenas Cora to produce Heather in court.
She enters the courtroom without the child and testifies that when she left
her home that morning, a large man with a ski mask that covered his head
took Heather at gunpoint and fled so quickly she is unable to describe him
or his car. Judge Row disbelieves her, finds her in contempt, and orders
her jailed until she tells the truth.
The abduction variation will be developed to show the consequences
for contemnors of incorrect factfinding. Cora's testimony that a ski-masked
man snatched Heather seems farfetched; but similar things have occurred
in human experience. Judge Row decides Cora was lying; he orders her
confined to coerce her to produce Heather. Cora's tale, however, turns out
to be merely unlikely but not untrue.
Because it is impossible for her to obey Judge Row's order, Cora begins
coercive confinement. Cora's confinement is not only indefinite, but also

22. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 365 (1966) (vacating contempt
judgment because of expiration of grand jury terms); Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1390
(9th Cir. 1978) (holding that defendant could not be held as a recalcitrant witness after default
judgment had been entered for trustee in bankruptcy); In re Richard, 373 N.W.2d 429, 431
(S.D. 1985) (holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue order forbidding defense

attorney from seeing witness incarcerated for contempt before grand jury after grand jury had
issued indictment without witness' testimony).
23. United States v. PATCO, 525 F. Supp. 820, 823 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
24. See Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System: Beyond

Contempt, 38 AM. IS.L. Rav. 491, 505 (1989) (discussing lack of procedural safeguards in civil
contempt cases); Harmer, supra note 2, at 254-56.
25. See Morgan v. Foretich, 521 A.2d 248, 253 (D.C. 1987).
26. See Harmer, supra note 2, at 256.
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interminable. We can note two consequences. First, a government official
has promulgated an impossible order and will imprison someone who is
unable to comply. We recoil from the contradiction of imprisoning someone
to force her to do the impossible. 27
Second, on a more mundane level, because Cora cannot comply with
Judge Row's order to produce Heather, we may recharacterize her imprisonment as criminal contempt with an unlimited criminal sentence imposed
after civil procedure. Will Cora be imprisoned forever to coerce her to do
something that, in fact, is not within her power?I "How can the prisoner
really does not know persuade his captors
being tortured for secrets that he
'29
that he does not know them?"
What principles of containment exist to prevent the debacle of potentially endless coercive confinement of Cora based on Judge Row's incorrect
factfindings? Are these principles consistent with plaintiff's substantive
interest? Do they preserve respect for court orders and the particular judge's
credibility? Can judges administer the principles fairly and without an
excessive burden on the process? Is there any way for the judge, if he
realizes his error, to back down gracefully?
The Supreme Court developed safety valves in bankruptcy turnover
proceedings in which the debtor is coerced to turn property over to the
bankruptcy estate to distribute to creditors. 0 The order to Cora to produce
Heather resembles, for present purposes, an order to a bankrupt retail
proprietor to turn over or to account for inventory.
The first task exists in the initial adjudication: to determine the burden
,of proof and to decide whether to develop presumptions. The choice is
-between a preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence,
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The proponent's burden of proof
may be crucial; for example in the recent Morgan contempt, the trial judge
found the evidence even, in equipoise, a clear signal that a more rigorous
3
burden of proof might have affected his decision to confhe.
The "elements" leading to coercive confinement for brach of an order
to turn over property are the same as Judge Row found against Cora,
except we substitute a person for property. The contemnor either possesses

27. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72 (1948) (noting that jailing someone for omitting
an act the individual is powerless to do would make contempt proceedings purely punitive);
J. RAwis, A THEORY OF JusTICE 237-39 (1971).
28. See 0. Fiss & D. R DaaMAN,
supra note 1, at 1085-97 (discussing contempt cases
involving professed inability to comply).
29. T. ScHmLLwG, TnE STRATEGY OF CONFLCT 115 (1960).
30. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 64 (1948) (holding that bankruptcy trustee seeking
turnover order has burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that defendant is
in possession of property); Oreil v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 362 (1929) (right to turnover order
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence). Compare Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum v. United States, 868 F.2d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that government did
not have burden of proving, at contempt hearing for violation of enforcement order for
recipient to produce documents, that recipient possessed documents).
31. Morgan v. Foretich, 521 A.2d 248, 253 (D.C. 1987).
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or knows where something is and refuses to deliver it or tell where it is.
The plaintiff's burden of proof, the Supreme Court held, is clear and
32
convincing evidence.
The Court first reasoned by analogy in the turnover decisions; fraud
requires clear and convincing evidence, and a turnover order is related to
fraud. The clear and convincing standard, Justice Jackson added, tells the
judge to reject "questionable experiment[s] in coercion which will recoil to
the discredit of the judicial process if time proves the adjudication to have
been improvident and requires the courts to abandon its enforcement." ' ,
Jackson's reasoning is more satisfactory; because contemnor's liberty is in
jeopardy, a more rigorous burden of proof is appropriate to reduce the risk
of erroneous confinement. 4 A preponderance standard is too flimsy to
protect individual liberty.
On the other hand the Court rejected Justice Black's view that plaintiff
must prove the prerequisites for coercive confinement beyond a reasonable
doubt.3 5 Coercive confinement's "punishment" exists, the majority said,
because the contemnor declines to obey. The judge may err and the
contemnor may suffer; "but the conscience of judges in weighing the
evidence under a clear perception of the consequences, together with the
opportunity of appeal and review, if properly taken, will restrain the courts
from recklessness of bankrulit's rights on the one hand and prevent the
' 36
bankrupt from flouting the law on the other.
The masked man who took Heather left Cora unable to obey Judge
Row's order. Contenmor's inability to comply is an affirmative defense to
37
coercive contempt; the contemnor bears the burden of proof on the issue.
A presumption in bankruptcy court turnover proceedings created a similar
practical effect. Proof that the contenmor possessed property earlier led the
judge to presume continued possession unless contemnor explained the way
that possession stopped.3 8 Both the burden of proof and the presumption
are grounded on the contemnor's access to the evidence and the need to
overcome the contemnor's incentive not to disclose it.

32. See Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 362 (1929); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 64
(1948).
33. Maggio, 333 U.S. at 67.
34. Id. at at 64. See C. McCoMIncK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVmENCE § 341 (2d
ed. 1972); R. PosrR, ECONOMC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.3 (3d ed. 1986).
35. Maggio, 333 U.S. at 78. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CoNTEMPT OF COURT 1
10, 22, 73, 75 [hereinafter PmIjmOR REPORT] (copy on file with author) (presented to
Parliament Dec. 1974) (recommending abolishing difference between civil and criminal contempt
and advising application of "beyond a reasohable doubt" standard of proof for both civil
and criminal contempt).
36. Oriel, 278 U.S. at 364.
37. See Drake v. National Bank of Commerce, 168 Va. 230, 239, 190 S.E. 302, 306
(1937).

38. See In re Luma Camera Serv., Inc., 157 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd sub
nom. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948).
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What if Cora stays in jail for eight months and then, persisting in her
original story, petitions the court to be released?3 9 Judge Row may conclude
that Cora's kidnapping tale sounds less cockamamie now. What effect does
his original disbelief have? What force does a presumption retain?
Judge Jerome Frank wrote a turnover opinion that affirmed a bankrupt
debtor's coercive confinement based on the presumption of continued possession. Judge Frank assumed that the debtor-contemnor had sold the
property and spent the proceeds. In reality, however, the contemnor had
not denied evidence of possession because that denial would have admitted
issuing a false financial statement and invited a criminal prosecution.4
"Although we know that [contemnor] cannot comply with the order,"
Judge Frank observed, "we must keep a straight face and pretend that he
can, and must thus affirm orders which first direct [him] to do an impos-

sibility, and then punish him for refusal to perform

it.

''

41

And to what

effect? Criminal punishment with neither a jury nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 The fairest reading of Judge Frank's opinion is that, to
invite reversal, he overstated the conclusions that precedent forced him to
reach.
The Supreme Court accepted Judge Frank's apparent invitation. First,
the Court told trial judges to administer the presumption of continued
possession through consideration of individual factors, not to evaluate the
presumption coldly and impersonally. Trial judges should consider: How
much time had passed? Is the property fungible, perishable, salable, or
consumable? Is the bankrupt thrifty or a "fast-living adventurer"? 43
The second issue is: when the contemnor later seeks release, what effect
does the judge's earlier decision to confine her have? Judge Frank, recognizing that res judicata perpetuated error, said that the initial decision to
confine the contemnor was preclusive later when the contemnor sought
release; this, Frank charged, confirmed the theory that two wrongs make a
right."
The Supreme Court overlooked Judge Frank's unsubtle hint; the Court
incorrectly accorded the original coercive confinement decision preclusive
effect, safe from later reexamination. 45 To see the error in the Court's

39. See Drake, 168 Va. at 239, 190 S.E. at 306 (holding that conclusion by trial court
on evidence of contempt stands upon same plane as jury verdict); see also 0. Fiss & D.
supra note 1, at 1086-97 (discussing cases of disbelief of ability to comply).
40. See Schwartz, Turnover and Contempt Proceedings in the Light of the History of
Maggio v. Zeitz, 5 UCLA L. Rnv. 75, 78 (1958).
41. In re Luma, 157 F.2d at 954.
42. See id. at 953 (discussing effect of presumption of continued possession).
43. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 66 (1948).
44. In re Luma, 157 F.2d at 954; see also Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 363 (1929)
(holding that only evidence that can be heard on petition of turnover order is evidence-of
newly arisen disability).
45. Maggio, 333 U.S. at 68-69. This was incorrect because normally only final judgments
RDLEmAN,

receive full preclusive effect; the more flexible law of the case doctrine governs separate phases
of the same lawsuit. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoN) oF JuDGmENTs § 13 (1980) (discussing finality
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approach, one need only examine the dilemma of Cora, who told an unlikely
truth that Judge Row disbelieved. Following an approach that accords the
original decision literal issue preclusive effect, if Cora repeats the story of
the ski-masked kidnapper ten months later, Judge Row will repeat his
disbelief." Judge Row's initial error leads to indefinite imprisonment for
Cora.
Should Judge Row keep Cora in coercive confinement to vindicate an
erroneous order? That would carry respect for court orders a little too far.
The trial judge may have changed his mind about the original factfinding.
The plaintiff may either be using civil process to punish contemnor or he
may decide to employ the leverage from confinement to bargain for concessions he is not entitled to.
These considerations may have affected Justice Jackson. For like a
careful mountain climber, he left handholds for the trial judge who has
gone too far out on the cliff of coercive confinement to grasp to find his
way back. The process must focus on the contemnor's obedience rather
than the contemnor. And each time the matter is heard, the judge must
focus on the contemnor's ability to comply at present. 47
Following Justice Jackson's approach, Cora may petition for release
ten months later and repeat her kidnapping story. Judge Row may believe
her testimony even though he previously thought she was lying. The earlier
finding in the hearing leading to confinement that Cora was able to comply
is preclusive only on the date of that hearing. 4"
The reasoning is persuasive, up to a point. A confined contemnor may
obey the order because of the loss of freedom and discomfort. However,
contemnor may disdain to comply and following "a reasonable interval of
time [that] has supplied the previous defect in the evidence, and has made
sufficiently certain what was doubtful before, namely, the [contenmor's]
inability to obey the order, he has always been released. ' 49 "The shadow
of the prison gates" coupled with contemnor's believable denial that present
compliance is possible may "convince the court that his is not a wilful
disobedience which will yield to coercion." 50 Judges may, however, persist

of judgments); Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REV. I (noting
that law of the case reflects view that separate phases of same lawsuit should be consistent
with each other).
The Supreme Court had already declined to base civil contempt on an incorrect order.
See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 295 (1947) (stating that "[t]he right
to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued").
46. See Maggio, 333 U.S. at 71, 75 (holding that original finding in contempt proceedings
has preclusive effect).
47. See id. at 63, 64; see also Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum v. United States, 868
F.2d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant who was ordered to produce invoices
but who did not assert nonpossession in enforcement hearing may, under Maggio, raise present
inability to comply at contempt hearing).
48. See Maggio, 333 U.S. at 70-72, 73-76.
49. In re Epstein, 206 F. 568, 570 (1913). See Maggio, 333 U.S. at 72 (quoting Epstein).
50. Maggio, 333 U.S. at 76 ; see also In re Bar-Craft Dresses, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 921,
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in disbelief, particularly if contemnor's tale is incredible."'
Justice Jackson has shown Judge Row how to return from the precarious
cliff. Judge Row rejected Cora's evidence that Heather was abducted. Ten
months later Judge Row can attenuate his earlier finding's res judicata
effect and decide that Cora is currently unable to obey. Is limiting res
judicata a pretext for Judge Row to admit surreptitiously that the factfinding
he originally based Cora's confinement on was incorrect? Or, to introduce
the second variation, will the safety 'alve for factual error turn into a ruse
that the lying or terminally stubborn contemnor will use to avoid obedience?
A second variation on Cora's disobedience is more complex. Suppose
that Cora opposes granting unsupervised custody of Heather to Fred on
the ground that she knows he has sexually molested the infant. Judge Row
finds that Cora has not proved her charges and grants Fred unsupervised
custody. Cora reasserts her belief that the child is in danger from her
father, refuses to produce her, and declines to answer questions about where
Heather is except to say that she is safe and healing. Judge Row finds Cora
in contempt and orders her jailed until she tells where the child is.
Normally disputes about a noncustodial parent's access to children are
subject to compromises about location and length of visitation. As Dr.
Elizabeth Morgan's protracted coercive confinement revealed, however, the
question of whether a mother should grant unsupervised custody to a person
she fears will molest the child is not amenable
to communication, reason,
2
negotiation, division, and compromise.
Judge Row has ordered Cora confined until she produces Heather or
tells where she is. Fred is interested in enjoying his substantive right, as
promulgated by Judge Row, to unsupervised custody of Heather. Judge
Row would like Fred to enjoy the rights guaranteed him under the substantive law. Furthermore, the judge is concerned about the credibility of
the court in future lawsuits and in public respect for court orders.
Cora declines to obey, instead refusing to answer a question. If Judge
Row had ordered Cora to produce the three-dollar coin and if she denies
ability to produce, either honestly or dishonestly, then the judge may
disbelieve her and confine her to coerce; later when she petitions for release,
the judge may escape through Justice Jackson's safety valve: articulate
present belief and terminate coercive confinement. The mute contemnor
who disdains either "to dissemble or to tell the truth, diminishes the chance

922 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (stating that imprisonment dissipates presumption that contemnor has
possession of property ordered to be surrendered); In re Luma Camera Serv., Inc., 84 F.
Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (noting importanceof fact that great period of time had elapsed
since turnover order in deciding on present inability to comply).
51. See Maggio, 333 U.S. at 75-76 ; Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F.2d 87, 91 (8th

Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955); In re Cal. Motors, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 885, 887
(E.D.N.Y. 1954); In re Sussman, 85 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); United States ex rel.
Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 1985).
52. See Harmer, supra note 2, at 256-69.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:185

for the judge to reconsider factfinding.5 3 If a contemnor declines even to
answer, the judge cannot use that safety valve.
Cora, though able, simply refuses to obey because she considers the
consequences of disobedience less serious than the consequences of obedience. One possibility is for her to obey. Each dawn, of course, brings the
chance that Cora will change her mind sometime during that day and effect
release. Coercive confinement theoretically lasts until contennor obeys or
forever, potentially as long as contemnor's lifetime.5 4 Cora will be released
when Heather reaches her age of majority.
As Cora settles into her cell, let us speculate, eliminate some possibilities,
and mention some refinements that we cannot eliminate. Judge Row has
done his best to communicate the threat. There was no asterisk in his voice
that revealed lack of commitment to stay the course. The authorities will
not find Heather. Fred will not abandon his quest for custody. Heather
will not reach her age of majority.
At the outset Cora is self-disciplined; she tells herself that even though
she knows where Heather is and can comply, she prefers the consequences
of disobedience over what she, rightly or wrongly, views as tragedy for
Heather and craven capitulation for herself. Her firmly held prediction that
Fred will molest Heather may be inaccurate, but it is based on some
evidence and she maintains it. If she is wrong about Fred, he may suffer
economic, social, and psychological harm or injury from the spiteful charges.
In the beginning we should assume contemnor is rational: after a certain
amount of confinement contemnor will value future liberty more than
obedience and saving face.5 5 If the judge appears to be firm, contemnor
will decide that obedience is a lesser evil than continued56incarceration and
to advance her own best interests, contemnor will obey.
Like all assumptions, the assumption that contemnor is rational is not
always warranted. 57 Several possibilities cannot be ruled out. Does Cora
think that Fred and Judge Row lack resolve and will back down? Is Cora
sentient enough to understand Judge Row's threat and to dislike the prospect
of jail? Cora may travel by dim light or her path may be lit by demons'
torches that the rest of us do not see; she may not apprehend Judge Row's
order; she may seek punishment for deeply seated reasons. Heather may be

53. See Maggio, 333 U.S. at 75 (stating that contemnor who stands mute does not meet
issue of inability to comply).
54. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959); Penfield Co. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S.
585, 594 (1947); In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 449 (8th Cir. 1902); Culver City v. Superior Court,
38 Cal. 2d 535, 241 P.2d 258 (1952); City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 512, 241
P.2d 245 (1952); see also Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM.
L. Rnv. 780, 801, 802 (1943); Comment, Equity-Contempt-Duration of Imprisonment, 36
MicH. L. Rnv. 1016, 1018 (1938).

55. See United States ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
56. See In re Griffin, 677 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Me. 1988) (holding that confinement must
continue as long as judge is satisfied that coercive sanction might produce intended result).
57. See In re Martin-Trigona, 590 F. Supp. 87, 88 n.2 (D. Conn. 1984) (discussing
contemnor's history of ad hominum attacks on judges).
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dead; and Cora may have plenty of reasons to remain silent. Prolonged
incarceration has a corrosive effect on the human psyche; we cannot assume
that Cora is immune. One final ominous possibility. Fred may know Cora
well enough to predict that she will disobey the order; and he may use the
confinement, not to coerce her, but for revenge.
Contemnor's confinement theoretically is self-imposed; she need only
comply and coercion never starts or ends. As one court stated: "If [contemnor] chooses to abide by the result of the adjudication and obey the
order ... [the contemnor] need not face jail. If, however, [the contemnor]
continues to disobey, we find on this record no constitutional objection to
the exercise of the traditional remedy of contempt to secure compliance.''38
Consider Judge Black's assessment of coercive contempt:
The law will not bargain with anybody to let its courts be defied
for a specific term of imprisonment. There are many persons who
would gladly purchase the honors of martyrdom in a popular cause
at almost any given price, while others are deterred by a mere show
of punishment. Each is detained until he finds himself willing to
conform. This is merciful to the submissive, and not too severe
upon the refractory. 59
CoERcIE vs. PUNrIVE CONFINEMENT
One contemnor, after several years confinement, asserted "I am the
only one that is being made to comply with the laws, and if others can
break the laws, then so can V ' 60 This contemnor, whose three appeals are
reported, 6' inspired a student notewriter to observe "it is evident that the
purposes of justice will be served best by keeping such persons as defendant
under lock and key. She may well spend her life in confinement, unless her
attitude changes.''62
The notewriter confused coercing to achieve compliance with punishing
disobedience through criminal contempt. He or she assumed that the au-

58. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959).
59. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902) (quoting Judge Black). See Uphaus,
360 U.S. at 81-82 (holding contempt order valid where contemnor stated his intention not to
produce documents); McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 63 (1939) (discussing contempt
order f6r refusal to answer questions during testimony concerning tax liability of another);
People ex rel. Valenti v. McCloskey, 6 N.Y.2d 390, 393, 160 N.E.2d 647, 650, 189 N.Y.S.2d
898, 899 (1959) (discussing contemnor's failure to testify); People ex rel. Feldman v. Warden,
46 A.D.2d 256, 25 -59, 362 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173-74 (1974) (finding that appellant willfully
refused to comply with order even though she had ability to do so and affirming judgment
of contempt), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 846, 331 N.E.2d 691, 370 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1975).
60. Tegtmeyer v. Tegtmeyer, 306 Ill.
App. 169, 178-79, 28 N.E.2d 303, 307 (1940), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 568 (1941).
61. Tegtmeyer v. Tegtmeyer, 314 Il.App. 16, 40 N.E.2d 767, cert. denied, 317 U.S.
689 (1942); Tegtmeyer v. Tegtmeyer, 306 Ill.
App. 169, 28 N.E.2d 303 (1940), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 568 (1941); Tegtmeyer v. Tegtmeyer, 292 Ill. App. 434, 11 N.E.2d 657 (1937).
62. Comment, supra note 54, at 1018.
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thorities might continue to imprison the contemnor to punish her even
though she initially had been confined after mere civil procedure. Because
of contemnor's exacerbated recalcitrance, the notewriter's confusion of
punitive with coercive purpose seems almost invited error. But after a cooler
reflection, coercion, it becomes apparent, went awry. The authorities may
punish a defiant contemnor, but they should announce it in advance and
use criminal procedure. 63 Prolonged ineffective coercive confinement without
criminal procedural protection undercuts public respect for the judicial
process. Everyone loses, plaintiff, defendant, the court system, and the
taxpayer. 64
How may we prevent these debacles? Should we attempt to do so?
Releasing contemnors without obedience thwarts plaintiffs' rights and diminishes judicial credibility. Have we abandoned the winning plaintiff's
right to enjoy his substantive entitlement? May release erode the judge's
ability to use coercive orders credibly and effectively in the future? Does
release undermine public respect for the law and the judicial process? Is
that too high a price?
We can state the basis for negative answers in at least two ways. First,
in an imperfect world, courts protect winning litigants' rights imperfectly.
Second, sometimes other interests are more important than litigants' substantive rights and the legal system favors those interests.
Several analogies exist to show how policymakers have developed doctrines that cut off a claimant's remedy for a violation. Cle rexamples show
the law refusing to help a creditor owed a just debt. If the creditor neglects
to file a lawsuit in time, the statute of limitations will bar the creditor from
suing successfully to obtain a judgment. Even if the creditor's debt is
embodied in a court judgment, passage of the statutory period will bar the
65
creditor from collecting a legally recognized debt from a deadbeat's assets.
The exemption statutes are a second example. Even if a creditor who
is owed a just debt has reduced that debt to judgment, the exemption
statutes say that the judgment debtor may withhold a minimum of property.

63. See United States v. Morales, 566 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that court

should first determine feasibility of coercing testimony through imposition of civil contempt
sanctions before resorting to criminal sanctions); United States v. Berardelli, 565 F.2d 24, 26
(2d Cir. 1977) (affiriing conviction for criminal contempt); United States v. De Simone, A67
F.2d 741, 747 (2d Cir.) (noting that criminal contempt sentence approached outer limits of
court's discretion), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959); Watkins v. Howard, 441 F. Supp. 486,
488 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (holding that it was no error to treat refusal to answer questions while
testifying as criminal rather than civil contempt and that it was no error to utilize summary
criminal proceedings); In re Farr, 64 Cal. App. 3d 605, 614, 134 Cal. Rptr. 595, 600 (1976)
(holding that criminal contempt proceeding was properly brought subsequent to coercive
proceedings).
64. See Harmer, supra note 2, at 267.
65. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-251 (1990) (barring creditor from collecting debt after 20
years); N.Y. CIV. PROC. L. & R. § 5014 (McKinney 1990) (barring creditor from collecting

after ten years); GA.
seven years).

CODE

ANN. § 9-12-60 (1990) (barring creditor from collecting debt after
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A debtor with less than the minimum of exempt property may avoid paying
creditors anything.66
Legislatures passed statutes of limitations and exemption statutes for
policy reasons that supersede the creditor's right to collect just debts.
Statutes of limitations protect the court system from stale evidence that
policymakers fear will be unreliable; in addition the statutes provide certainty
and repose for people who rely on things continuing as they are. Exemption
statutes leave debtors with a minimum cushion of property available for
them and their families. The statutes of limitations and exemptions are
available to debtors even when the policies do not apply.
We will return to Cora whom we left confined to coerce her to do
something she implacably refuses to do. Even if we eliminate the possibility
of obedience, contemnors may become uncoercible and be released. How
can Judge Row's order coercing Cora lose coercive power? The United
Kingdom's influential Phillimore report recommended abandoning sine die
coercive confinement committals for fixed terms: "Obstinate contemnors
have to be released eventualfr, despite non-compliance." 67 An Australian
study agreeing that the primary purpdse of coercing swallows an element
of deterrence, nevertheless, suggested an upper limit on coercive confinement
to deal with a contemnor who "resolutely refuses" to obey and is "prepared
to make a martyr" of herself rather than obeying.6s
Two principles of containment limit coercive contempt confinement to
prevent indefinite imprisonment.6 9 First, a judge may hold that the coercive
goal is unreachable and terminate confinement. Second, the legislature can
cap coercive confinement so that it ends after a time certain.,

THm JunicLIRY A

COER6rE CoNm~mrr

The first principle of containment, that a judge may hold that the
coercive goal is unreachable and terminate confinement, is a judicially

66. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779 (1974) (defining
exempted property as thgt which, by statute, may not be subjected to legal proceeding to
satisfy creditor's claim):
A debtor has two other ways to avoid contractual obligations than waiting out the statute
of limitations and claiming exemptions. First, a judge will relieve her from contractual
obligations if performance turns out to be impossible or impracticable. G. PALMER, THE LAw
op REsTrrtroN Ch. 7 (1978). Second, she can file for bankruptcy, discharge her obligation to
pay a just debt, and enjoy her fresh start.
67. PmmuioRE REPoRT, supra note 35, at 74.
68. Chesterman & Waters, supra note 5, at 120.
69. Compare Apel, supra note 24, at 521-26 (arguing that contemnors should be able to
argue necessity to be released from coercive contempt confinement) with Morgan v. Foretich,
546 A.2d 407, 411 (D.C. 1988) (rejecting necessity defense in contempt proceedings), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 790 (1989). Professor Apel offers the following defimition of necessity:
contemnor believes in good faith that disobedience is necessary to protect the child. Id. at
521-22. Even though the District of Columbia court of appeals rejected the necessity defense
in contempt, contemnors might consider interposing it as an alternative to the theories discussed
below.
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developed doctrine. Coercive confinement may lose its power to coerce and
the uncoercible person should be released. The courts reason that coercive
confinement should not be transformed into a criminal punishment that
was imposed without criminal procedure. 70 How can the judge and plaintiff
tell whether coercion will fail? When should the judge subordinate his
credibility, the plaintiff's substantive rights, and public respect for courts?
Most of the long distance contemnors who appear in the recent reported
decisions have violated orders to testify. Immunity often overcomes the
witness's privilege against self-incrimination. Contemnor, knowing the answer, refuses to respond satisfactorily. 71 The judge orders contenmor into
coercive confinement until a satisfactory answer is forthcoming. Some long
distance contemnors have asserted a testimonial privilege; after the judge
rejects the privilege, they persist 73in adhering to its policy. 72 Some contemnors
without more refuse to answer.
After a time the confined long distance contemnors petition to be released. 74 There is, they assert, no realistic possibility or no substantial likelihood
that additional confinement will coerce; thus the confinement's character has
transmogrified from coercive to punitive, and due process compels release. 7

70. See 0. Fiss & D. RENDLmaA, supra note 1, at 1097-1107 (discussing cases where
court has reasoned that coercive confinement has been transformed into criminal punishment
without criminal procedure); Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87 (1976) (holding that continued
confinement resulting from contempt order raises serious federal constitutional concerns); In
re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (holding that point at which contempt
commitment ceases to serve coercive purpose it becomes punitive in character and becomes
subject to statutory maximum sentence); Catena v. Seidl, 343 A.2d 744, 68 N.J. 224 (1975)
(stating that coercive contempt order cannot be used to punish contemnor for past refusal to
comply); Comment, Contempt: Civil Contempt OrderMay Not Include Absolute Sentence, 47
MmN. L. REv. 907, 913-14 (1963) (noting that imprisonment of contemnor may reach point
where it becomes more punitive than coercive); Comment, Incarcerationfor Civil Contempt:
An Asserted Eighth Amendment ChallengeFaces a Semantical Defense, 11 SAN Dic,o L. Rnv.
1026 (1974) (noting constitutional attack on potentially indefinite confinement for civil contempt
as cruel and unusual punishment); see also Note, Due Process in Civil Contempt Proceedings:
A Comparison with Juvenile and Mental Incompetency Requirements, 44 FoiRDE
L. Ray.
1029 (1976) (noting need to evaluate due process afforded to civil contemnor).
71. See, e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 2 (D.C. App. 1989) (finding confinement
no longer coercive but punitive where contemnor persisted in refusal to comply); Lambert v.
Montana, 545 F.2d 87, 88 (1976) (noting that contemnor knew identity of perpetrator but
refused to disclose information); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 66, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 345 (1971) (noting contemnor's refusal to answer questions at trial).
72. See In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
73. See, e.g., Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87, 88 (9th Cir. 1976); Morgan v. Foretich,
564 A.2d 1, 2 (D.C. App. 1989); Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 247, 343 A.2d 744, 746 (1975).
74. Many are habeas corpus petitions. See Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.
App. 1989) (merging habeas corpus petition with domestic relations lawsuit).
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1988) (limiting term of coercive confinement to eighteen
months). Most of the federal decisions on terminating coercive confinement were decided under
this statute. But see Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87, 89 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that
continued coercive confinement under Montana statute raised important federal constitutional

issues).
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Felicitously stated: "recalcitrance then results in imprisonment, but real recalcitrance results in release." 76
Some kind of safety valve is needed to set a cut off; this should avoid
the extreme of protracted, perhaps indefinite, ineffective confinement without criminal procedure. The safety valve also must steer clear of the other
extreme; it should protect winning litigants' rights and prevent the public

perception that court orders are not worth the paper they are written on.
The reported opinions expose the peril of administering any standard.
From the point of view of developing precedent, the decisions are unsatisfactory. Some of the things trial judges and appellate courts say about
releasing and declining to release long distance contemnors follow.

If civil coercive confinement loses its ability to coerce, it becomes
punitive or criminal punishment imposed after civil procedure, and the judge

will order the authorities to release contemnor? The line between coercion
and punishment is not bright, but fine and difficult to discern. 78 Contemnor
has the burden of proof, both of persuasion and production, to convince
the judge that there is no realistic possibility that further confinement will

coerce. 79 The decisions are factual; each involves one person's discrete

confinement and will power. The judge's factfinding is predictive, not
historical. s0
The judge's decision must be individualized. 8 ' Individualized decisions
mean two things. First, the decisions have reduced precedential value because
they are discrete to a particular contemnor. Second, the judge may not
continue to confine this contemnor to deter future disobedience or to
encourage other potential and actual contemnors to obey. 2 The judge's

76. Apel, supra note 24, at 525.
77. See, e.g., In re Howald, 877 F.2d 849, 850 (11th Cir. 1989); Soobzokov v. CBS,
Inc., 642 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420,
423-24 (3d Cir. 1979).
78. See In re Pantojas, 639 F.2d 822, 825 (Ist Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1979); King v. Department of Social and Health Serv.,
110 Wash. 2d 793, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988).
79. See In re Howald, 877 F.2d 849, 850 (11th Cir. 1989); Simkin v. United States, 715
F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420,
425 (3d Cir. 1979); King, 110 Wash. 2d at 756.
80. See In re Parrish, 782 F.2d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing nature of judge's
factfinding in dealing with asserted terminal stubbornness). The judge must gauge the likelihood
that contemnor's disobedience will continue indefinitely, because there is no prospect that
contemnor will obey. This differs from usual judicial factfinding which involves retrospective
determination of historical fact. This type of factfinding also differs from two kinds of
factfinding predictions: prospective determinations of future facts (for example, what future
medical expense will accrue) and future hypothetical factfinding (for example, profits that
would have occurred except for the breach). Id.
81. See In re Howald, 877 F.2d at 850 (stating that court must make individualized
determination of possible future compliance); Simkin, 715 F.2d at 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting
individualized and predictive nature of judge's determination in contempt proceeding); Sanchez
v. United States, 725 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting broad discretion in trial judge to
determine whether contempt confinement has lost its coercive effect).
82. See Simkin, 715 F.2d at 38.
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appearance of firmness affects a particular contempt: for contemnor's
"realization that the Court is not inclined to relent is also likely to cause
him to reevaluate his course and decide to end this wasteful hiatus in his
own best interests." 3 If, however, judges seek to advance the goals of
punishing disrespect for courts and court orders and to encourage contemnors and others to obey future orders, criminal contempt is, at least in
theory, available. s4
The second point, in the writer's view, probably is cut too fine. The
primary purpose of coercive contempt is to achieve obedience to a particular
order and to benefit the successful party. Punishing past breaches with
criminal contempt induces future obedience by both the offender and
potential offenders. Coercive confinement "implicitly, if not explicitly, also
contains a subsidiary element of punishment for defiance of the court's
authority." 5
Coercive confinement's secondary or implicit effect of structuring future
incentives in other disputes, while it cannot be the intended purpose or the
primary goal, nevertheless cannot be ignored.
The contemnor's self-serving testimony will support her contention that
she will never relent. This evidence will be relevant; but for a self-respecting
judiciary it is perforce less than dispositive.8 6 The judge may reject "as
decisive a conteifinor's avowed intention never to testify."17 If contemnor
states present intent never to comply, the judge may decide that further
confinement may change contemnor's mind. The issue for the judge to
decide is not whether contemnor believes then that she will never obey, but
whether the trial judge believes there is no realistic possibility.88 Family and
friends, health professionals, including mental health professionals, as well
as spiritual counselors may corroborate contemnor. 9
Other factors bear on the decision. Courts have mentioned contemnor's
age apparently because actuarially a period of confinement is a bigger
proportion of an elderly person's remaining years.9 Bad or frail health may

83. In re Griffin, 677 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Me. 1988).
84. See In re Ford, 615 F. Supp. 259, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (criticizing Simkin as

emasculating the civil contempt sanction); In re Cocilovo, 618 F. Supp. 1378, 1380 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (same); In re Parish, 613 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that Simkin negates and
complicates civil contempt proceedings), aff'd, 782 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1986).

85. Chesterman & Waters, supra note 5, at 109.
86. See Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. App. 1989).
87. In re Griffin, 677 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Me. 1988); see also In re Parrish, 782 F.2d
325, 327 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Howald, 877 F.2d 849, 850 (11th Cir. 1989).
88. See In re Parrish, 782 F.2d at 327-28; Simkln, 715 F.2d at 37; United States v.
Salerno, 632 F. Supp. 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); King v. Department of Social and Health
Serv., 110 Wash. 793, 804, 756 P.2d 1303, 1309-10 (1988).
89. See Morgan, 564 A.2d at 3 (noting testimony by friends and professionals regarding

contemnor's resolve to stay in jail and refuse compliance).
90. See Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 229-30, 343 A.2d 744, 747 (1975) (noting contemnor's advanced age and failing health as considerations in ordering contemnor's release).
According to press reports a 77 year old grandmother-contemnor, who was confined in
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support the judge's decision to release a contemnor, 91 apparently because
confinement of the infirm generates sympathy. But medical evidence will
not always lead to release.9
How long contemnor has been confined is important for the same
reasons as age and health, and also because in a blunt fashion, judges
conclude that past patience lets a factfmder infer future patience. Each
month that passes strengthens contemnor's claim that she is "unable" to
obey. 93 Another court, however, read the duration's auguries differently and
concluded that time spent in prison increases contemnor's "desire for
freedom and concomitantly the willingness to testify."
The reason contenmor states for noncompliance probably affects the
court's decision. Although one contemnor unsuccessfully claimed "motherhood" as a basis to release her, 9 Cora interposes a mother's love for her
little daughter and fear that the child will be molested to explain her
disobedience.9 Cora bases her noncompliance on a higher law of motherhood: because the court system is infected with male bias against women
and children, she will protect the child because the judicial authorities will
not.
A contemnor who bases resistance on an established moral principle
may win sympathy, even though her conduct may misplace, exaggerate, or
distort that principle. Long distance contemnors frequently ground disobedience on ideology.Y Sometimes coercive confinement focuses'media attention on contenmor as a victim, communicates contemnor's( determination,
if. not militancy, and confers the mantle of martyrdom. Contemnor may
draw support from others of similar ideological bent who view the contemnor as a hero or martyr. 98 More strikes have been won than broken, it is
the author's observation, because judges jailed union leaders. Supporters

a custody dispute to coerce her to tell where her daughter and granddaughters were, was
released after eight days behind bars failed to break her silence. Addenda, Wash. Post, Sept.
19, 1990, at A7.
91. See, e.g., In re Griffin, 677 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Me. 1988); Catena, 68 N.J. at 22930, 343 A.2d at 747.
92. See, e.g., In re Dickinson, 763 F.2d 84, 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that contemnor
was diabetic, but basing release on other factors).
93. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
94. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 428 (3d Cir. 1979); see also
In re Cantazaro, 663 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1985) (quoting Braun). '.
95. See In re Thornton, 560 F. Supp. 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also In re Griffim,
677 F. Supp. at 26 (denying contemnor's argument based on diabetic condition and desire to
see family).
96. See, e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C. App. 1989).
97. See, e.g., In re Parrish, 782 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1986) (Black Liberation Movement);
In re Ford, 615 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (political activist, "grand jury resisters"); In
re Parish, 613 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Sunrise Collective); In re Dohrn, 560 F. Supp.
179 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Weather Underground); In re Richard, 375 N.W.2d 429 (S.D. 1985)
(involving traditional Indian values).
98. See, e.g., In re Dohrn, 560 F. Supp. at 180 n.4.
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may conduct sophisticated campaigns to achieve contemnor's release. 99 Friends
of Elizabeth Morgan, for example, organized a newsletter with a mailing
list of 15,000.
One court stated candidly that if contemnor adhered to an "established
moral principle," it might attenuate his stay.'0° Another judge said that the
moral principle test is "incapable of practical application." 011 Contemnors'
zeal in professing their causes may exceed trial judges' skepticism about
their sincerity, but the trial judge has the last, or next to last, word. Judges
have expressed reservations. Contenmors who claim principle as a basis for
silence "are usually co-conspirators attempting to conceal their own criminal
involvement." 1 02 The contemnor's path may be lighted by an ignoble desire
"to obtain the fruits of his friends' criminal activity." 103 Religious protestations are either a "sham" or extend beyond legal protection. 1 4 "While
Saint Jeanne was canonized for what she did," one doubting trial judge
reminded a contemnor, "probably most modem philosophers regard her as
deranged."10 5
An unsympathetic contemnor may present a sympathetic basis for
release. A member of organized crime who is protecting accomplices is a
most rational long distance contemnor. One tuch contemnor previously has
served ten years rather than inform. 1'6 A contemnor's patience in the face
of lengthy unsuccessful coercion may demonstrate adherence to "organized
crime's oath of silence." 1 7 To put it another way, "[c]ement walls are
better than cement boots."'' 0 Can a judge who senses this stand passively
by when the authorities may be exploiting contemnor's mindset to incarcerate
him without having proved that he violated a criminal statute?1°9 One judge

99. See id. (discussing sophisticated letter writing compaign in support of contemnor's
release); In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (acknowledging substantial
number of Episcopal officials seeking contemnors' release).
100. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653 (1974).
101. Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 229 n.1, 343 A.2d 744, 747 n.1 (1975). But see In re
Cueto, 443 F. Supp. at 862.
102. In re Dohrm, 560 F. Supp. at 180 n.4.
103. In re Papadakis, 613 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
104. See id.; In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
105. In re Jabbar, 560 F. Supp. 186, 188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
106. See In re Papadakis, 613 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
107. Catena v. Seidl, 343 A.2d 744, 747 (1975). See Comment, supra note 54, at 1033
n.28, 1039 n.65.
108. Courtesy of Teaneck, New Jersey native, Fred Schauer.
109. Fear of retaliation, threats, or risk do not justify refusal to answer and are not
defenses to coercive contempt. See In re Crededio, 759 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding
unpersuasive defendants' fear of retaliation); In re Griffin, 677 F. Supp. 26, 28-29 (D. Me.
1988) (stating that asserted threat against witness is not legal justification for refusal to testify);
United States v. Dien, 598 F.2d 743, 745 (2d Cir. 1978) (asserting that allowance of reprisal
defense would undermine civil contempt statute); United States v. Doe, 862 F.2d 430, 432
(1988) (duress, fear of reprisal, is not a basis to decline to answer but a circumstance to
consider in deciding whether coercion will be effective), citing Simkin v. United States, 715
F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Note, The Dilemma of the Intimidated Witness In Federal
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thought not; releasing the most rational contenmor has "the perverse result

of creating a special, more lenient standard for that class of contemnor
most committed to defying the court's order and thus least entitled to
relief.""

0

The plaintiffs need for contemnor to comply, while not relevant to the
issues, appears to affect some decisions. How significant is the goal of
coercion? The judge may coerce less to achieve compliance with "relatively

minor" order."' If the authorities already have, for example, contenmor's
spontaneous handwriting exemplars, the judge is likely to mention that to
buttress a decision that she is, in any event, uncoercible." 2 Time changes
things. If contemnor is confimed to coerce evidence, such as where a fugitive

is, the passage of time may render the evidence stale."' And after several
months the authorities
have had an opportunity to learn the evidence from
4
other sources."
The judge will consider many factors including the length of time
contemnor has been confined and the contemnor's statements and behavior.
But the judge lacks "rules" and may not even have reliable rules of thumb.
For no single factor is dispositive of any one claim to be uncoercible."'
The legal standard confers vast discretion on the trial judge as initial
decisionmaker who observed witness's demeanor and otherwise developed a
feel for the issues." 6 The judge's discretion on both procedure and merits,
one court said, is "virtually unreviewable.""17 The judge relying on "prior
observations" may even decline to conduct a factual hearing."8 A trial
judge who clearly has lost patience with contemnor may be tempted to
avoid futile confrontations by undermining both the appearance of legiti-

macy and the administration of decisions on individual petitions." 9

Organized Crime Prosecutions: Choosing Among the Fear of Reprisals, the Contempt Powers
of the Court, and the Witness Protection Program, 50 FoRMA L. Ray. 582 (1982) (arguing
fear of retaliation or reprisal should be defense to coercive contempt).
But see In re Freligh, 894 F.2d 881, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1990) (creating important qualification). A contemnor's genuine and reasonable fear that criminals will retaliate against him
or his family is enough of a potential "just cause" to decline to answer to qualify him for
an evidentiary hearing where he may adduce testimony to inform coercive contempt's "equitable
character." Id.
110. In re Ford, 615 F. Supp. 259, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Ill. See King v. Department of Social and Health Serv., 110 Wash. 2d 793, 804, 756
P.2d 1303, 1310 (1988) (asserting, in dicta, that extended confinement for refusal to comply
with minor order is abuse of discretion).
112. See In re Dohm, 560 F. Supp. 179, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
113. See In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
114. See id. at 864.
115. See King v. Department of Social and Health Serv., 110 Wash. 2d at 793.
116. See In re Howald, 877 F.2d 849, 850 (11th Cir. 1989).
117. United States v. Doe, 862 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Simkin v. United
States, 715 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983)).
118. See United States v. Salerno, 632 F. Supp. 529, 531 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
119. See In re Martin-Trigona, 590 F. Supp. 87, 89 (D. Conn. 1984) (refusing to allow
contemnor hearing due to belief that hearing is only delay tactic).
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Trial judges state the general rules as prefaces to statements of their
discretion and draft holdings narrowly enough to make them distinguishable
in the future.120 Appellate courts in their turn find ways to decide individual
appeals without creating coherent precedent; they erect even more cryptic
signposts. 121 Statutes and the contemnor's confinement qualify appellate
detachment with an accelerated decisionmaking schedule.1 2
Two salient features run through the appellate decisions: lengthy restatements of the trial judge's latitude and complex discussions of the scope
of review. 23 The trial judge's broad discretion followed by the necessarily
tolerant review create more decisions that do not guide future decisionmakers
to results. 24
Releasing contemnors under the "rules" and process outlined above has
not escaped criticism. One trial judge wrote that the terminal stubbornness
doctrine coupled with "virtually unreviewable discretion" in section 1826
contempts leads judges to release contemnors routinely after six months,
undermines grand jury investigations, "emasculate[s] an act of Congress,"
and creates an "administrative nightmare." The proper inquiry, he argued,
is coercive purpose and ability to comply, not effect, not "the strength of
the contemnor's intransigence." In short the contemnor's certain knowledge
,that authorities will confine him for eighteen months to secure obedience
will coerce better than an unstable terminal stubbornness doctrine usually
leading to release after six months 25
THE GAMm OF CoERC vE CONFINEMENT
Some view the judicial doctrines on claims of uncoercibility in coercive
confinement as a way to seek succor for virtue in distress. Others insist
that a pigheaded recalcitrant be forced to obey. Between these partisan
extremes exists a balanced way to analyze long distance coercive confinement. A discussion of terminal stubbornness as strategic bargaining in the
26
frame of reference of game theory provides some perspective.

120. See In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857, 861-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (distinguishing several
state and federal cases).
121. See In re Howald, 877 F.2d 849, 851 (11th Cir. 1989); Simkin v. United States, 715
F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983); King v. Department of Social and Health Serv., 110 Wash. 793,
756 P.2d 1303 (1988).
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) (1988) (stating that appeal from order of confinement must
be disposed of within thirty days).
123. See, e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 4-9 (D.C. App. 1989).
124. The Morgan case has less precedential value than most cases. The three-judge panel
opinion consists of an elaborate review of scope of review and the evidence, a mysterious
concurrence, and a vigorous dissent. The opinion was forthwith vacated for consideration by
the whole court. Congress passed a statute that applied to the contemnor and led to her release
before the whole court considered the appeal. See supra note 1.
125. See In re Codilovo, 618 F. Supp. 1378, 1382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (asserting that a
six month threat of imprisonment is too little to effectively garner contemnor's testimony).
126. See 0. Fiss & D. REammA, supra note 1, at 1004-12, 1104-07 (discussing game
theory in context of coercive contempt).
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The principal players are the judge and the contemnor. Coercive confinement is negotiation with conduct substituted for threats. The judge's
conduct consists of imposing the confinement on contenmor to seek a
concession, obedience. Each day contemnor is confined is one of a series
of small coercions that are consecutive and perhaps continuous; each demonstrates the threat of more by lending it plausibility. The cliche that
contemnor has the jailhouse keys in her pocket communicates to her the
message that the judge has relinquished the initiative to her. The judge's
statenent plus the confinement lets contemnor predict what will happen
next and coordinate her conduct with that prediction.
"Chicken is a universal form of adversary engagement."' 27 In chicken
each player uses her willingness to suffer injury or risk to communicate
resolve to the other to convince the other to yield. 12 Chicken is found less
frequently in the legal structure than in less law-laden environments like the
relations between belligerent nations and street gangs.
Expressing aggression by saying, in effect, "I'll suffer until you say
'uncle"' instead of "fighting" is a passive-active form of chicken that is
available to confined contemnors.12 9 Accordingly, we do find confined
contemnors threatening to stay in jail, for example, until a particular judge
ceases to preside.'30 Perhaps more likely to succeed was the contemnor who
raised the stakes of strategic bargaining by fasting in jail, observing, "I
3
realize it will ultimately result in death."' '
The contemnor's terminal stubbornness is an invitation to play chicken
that the judge cannot refuse, a way for contemnor to relinquish the initiative
back to the judge. She takes the keys from her pocket and throws them
out the window. "To serve a larger goal, I am willing to endure incarceration
until you relent or tragedy occurs. You are the only one who is able to
prevent the tragedy."
Contemnor invests her life in giving public force to her convictions.
Long confinement forces us to respect the inner strength that leads to the
patience and to project that strength forward. Contemnor uses the strength
of her resolve not to obey, to clarify her unyielding\, Nill. Protracted
confinement has two further effects: it goes a long ways towards vindicating
the sanctity of the law, and it strengthens, or at least does not erode, the
credibility of the judge.
For almost everyone, at some point along the continuum of continued
confinement, coercion stops and cruelty begins. Different people have
different thresholds.132 Contemnor's terminal stubbornness may allow the

127. T. ScHnu.uo,

AR s AND IN LUENcE

116 (1966).

128. See T. ScHELLIo, supra note 29, at 139 n.17; T. ScHELING, supra note 127, at 42
n.5.
129. 0. Fiss & D. RENDILtEA,

supra note 1, at 1107.

130. See In re Martin-Trigona, 590 F. Supp. 87, 88-89 (D. Conn. 1984).
131. In re Richard, 373 N.W.2d 429, 433 (S.D. 1985). See Sanchez v. United States, 725
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1984).
132. Compare Comment, Equity-Contempt-Durationof Imprisonment, 36 MicH. L. REv.
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judge to say, in effect, "At first we thought you would capitulate, but now
we know otherwise."
Our zeal to achieve plaintiffs' rights through coercive contempt carries
with it, as the game of chicken should reveal, an imposing potential for
abuse. Our system usually checks state power to deprive a citizen of liberty
by filtering it through several official bodies: a legislature passes a criminal
statute that defines punishable misconduct and sets a maximum period of
confinement, a prosecuting attorney decides to move forward, a jury concludes unanimously that the authorities proved the misconduct beyond a
reasonable doubt. Coercive confinement concentrates that state power in
one judge who finds the facts and formulates predictions based on clear
and convincing evidence. As each day of coercive confinement ends, the
contemnor's day was identical to her fellow inmate's who has been convicted
of a crime.
Because the doctrine that converts coercive confinement exists, more
contemnors will be terminally stubborn. If there were no doctrine leading
to release, more contenmors would obey. Confining a civil litigant without
a jury trial and other criminal protection is expensive; lengthy unsuccessful
imprisonment may create an aura of moral opprobrium. When can we
conclude from futile past confinement that further confinement will be just
as futile? When is it safe to say that contemnor's stubbornness is truly
terminal, not a bluff or a pose? Has the judge who frees a contemnor
without her obedience lost a game of chicken? Would one more day of
confinement lead to compliance?
Interdeterminate decisionmaking through coercion and resistance is a
form of crisis negotiation that may careen tragically awry. Ambiguity lurks
in every human communication, particularly in nonverbal communication
through threats and measures. The judicial system lacks a face saving way
of showing doubt, changing its mind, retreating, backing down, or capitulating. Our attention focuses on the judge and individual responsibility in
the judicial hierarchy.
A less benign possibility is that either the judge or the plaintiff may
sense in a terminally stubborn contemnor an opportunity to use her resistance to convert coercion to punishment. Contemnor disobeys or resists;
her disobedience begets anger, which becomes in turn revenge cloaked in
supposed coercion. Defiance and retaliation develop a showdown dynamic
that supplants the original controversy.
Absent a limit imposed from outside the judicial system, a contemnor
may remain incarcerated for "perhaps even several years."' Dr. Morgan
had entered her third year of confinement, unrelieved by a judiciary unwilling or unable to correct its own mistakes, when Congress passed legis.
lation that led to her release.
1016, 1018 (1938) (advocating continued confinement for rest of life) with In re Cueto, 443
F. Supp. 857, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (advocating continued confinement for six months "in
situations of this kind").
133. United States ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
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CODIFICATION

A statutory cap is the second limit on coercive confinement,' 3 4 judicial
termination being the first. The federal recalcitrant witness statute limits
coercive confinement to eighteen months or the life of the grand jury,
whichever is shorter. 35 Two states' statutes cap coercive confinement generally-California at one year, 3 6 Wisconsin at six months. 37 Congress, in
response to Dr. Morgan's confinement, passed a short-lived cap for coercive
confinement in the District of Columbia for cases involving domestic rela138
tions and child custody.
A statute that caps coercive confinement resembles a statute of limitations or an exemption statute. The theory is that to prevent harshness and
potential arbitrariness the government will protect plaintiffs' rights by
coercing contemnor this much, but no more. A cap will terminate all
coercive confinements after a certain period. Even though community faith
in courts depends on "some sort of authoritarian response" to violations,
"when a period as long as two years has elapsed and a contemnor is still
intransigent, it cannot be said that the sentence is coercive any more,
because the likelihood of compliance has been shown to be extremely
low.'1

39

The legislature presumes tacitly or implicitly that after a set time passes
coercive confinement ceases to perform its function and becomes a futile,
destructive waste of taxpayers' funds. Imprisonment of a contemnor beyond
the set period may abuse civil process because it punishes someone whom
further confinement will not coerce. 14 In providing for a statutory cap, the
legislature states that after the set time passes, the potential benefit of
contemnor's obedience will be subordinated to the burden on society and
the recalcitrant person. Contemnor will not be released from her duty to
obey; but the authorities will be limited to other methods than coercive
4
confinement to achieve obedience.' '
The arguments against legislative caps on coercive confinement typically
follow one or more of three theories. The first is a basic notion that the
legislature should leave judicial business to judges. A second theory is that

134. See Hearingson H.R. 2136 Before the Districtof Columbia'sSubcomm. on Judiciary
and Education, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 59-109 (1989) (statement of Doug Rendleman); Hearings
on S. 1163 Before the Subcomm. on GeneralServices, Federalism, and the Districtof Columbia,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21-25 (1989) (statement of Doug Rendleman).
"135. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)(2) (1988).
136. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 19.2 (West 1990).

137. See Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 785.04 (1)(b) (West 1989).
138. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-944(b) (Supp. 1990); see also Harmer, supra note 2, at
269-77 (providing fairly complete summary of legislative process).
139. Chesterman & Waters, supra note 5, at 135.
140. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 1979)
(asserting that civil contempt is abused if continued beyond point where further confinement
will not result in testimony).
141. See Morgan v. Fortich, 564 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C. App. 1989).
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the judicial doctrines suffice to release terminally stubborn contemnors
under appropriate circumstances. A final contention is that any cap redounds
to the benefit of recalcitrant contemnors and undercuts court orders and

plaintiffs' rights.
In the division of business between courts and legislatures, judges usually
let legislatures draw the specific lines. Examples include the age of majority,
statutes of limitations, almost all tax laws affecting dependents and rate. 42
In the Morgan appeal, the District of Columbia authorities asked the court
to establish a time period to limit coercive confinement. The majority and
concurring opinion did not deign to mention the idea; the dissenter observed
in a footnote, "This is of course a matter for the legislature."' 43 That was
a sound response.
The existing common-law rule to release uncoercable contemnors is
unsatisfactory. Several reasons for legislatures to cap coercive confinement
exist. Dr. Elizabeth Morgan declined to release her daughter to the child's
father because she feared sexual abuse; she spent twenty-five months in a
District of Columbia jail, seven months longer than a thug who refused,
under grant of immunity, to identify criminals. The imprecise common-law
rules delegate too much unchecked power to a lone trial judge. Lawyers
representing contemnors or opposing release cannot know what kind of
evidence to adduce or how to frame the issues for argument. The imprecise
common-law rules leave trial judges uncertain about how to decide. There
is widespread disagreement about how much coercive confinement suffices
for an individual.
John Seldon's comment bears repeating: "Equity is according to the
conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower so
is Equity. Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure
we call a foot to be the Chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure
would this be! One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a
third an indifferent foot."'14 The unusually high level of subjectivity observed above leads observers to concur. Too much discretion concentrates

142. See G. PALMER, RESTITUTION § 5.5 n.25 (1978). Professor Palmer argues that a court
may establish a rule of thumb that a nondefaulting vendor could keep ten percent of the
defaulting buyer's down payment. Answering the argument that precise rules are the legislature's
function, Palmer says that "judges looked at the matter differently during the growth of the
common law" and provides examples, the age of majority, the presumption of death after
seven years' absence, and the rule against perpetuities. We live today in a more pervasive age
of statutes. See also United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 65.6, 66364 (2d Cir. 1989) (setting absolute dollar limit on right to jury trial; petty-serious line to
determine jury right 'for corporation charged. with criminal contempt: $100,001 is always
serious, below that compare wealth and fine to determine seriousness).
143. Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 19 n.7 (D.C. App. 1989) (dissenting opinion of
Mack, J.).
144. J. SELDEN, EQUITY TABLE-TALK 46 (Arber ed. in English Reprints, nos. 1-7, London:
1869) 0. Fiss & D. RNDLEmAN, supra note 1, at 110 (quoting J. SELDEN, TEE TABLE-TALK
OF Jom SELDEN (1647)).
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power in a troublesome way and leads to unpredictable decisions, unequal
application, and, ultimately, away from the rule of law. 145
The trial judge may have ceased to be an umpire and become a
participant with a personal stake in enforcement. Some trial judges are
temprementally or emotionally unprepared for the high-stakes decisionmaking involved in terminating coercive confinement; the usual checks on their
error or incompetence are greatly diluted or absent. 146
What results can we observe from the lack of a statutory cap on
coercive confinement? Decisions that appear to be at best arbitrary and
capricious and at worst harsh. Futile imprisonments that lead to unnecessary
confinement that wastes the taxpayers' money and the contemnor's ability
to contribute to society. Contemnors shop for judges, exacerbating the
unpredictability of results. The result is a decreasing respect for the courts
and the government.
The Phillimore Report argues that a fixed term of coercive confinement
preserves respect for the judge and court orders. Because eventually an
obstinate contemnor will be released, a "fixed [coercive contempt] term
would save the appearance of a climb-down by the court and would obviate
the need for an application for release and uncertainty as to the appropriate
timing of it."' 47
Justice Clark said that a limited period of coercive confinement is the
"type of sentence [that] would benefit an incorrigible witness."' 4 Limiting
coercive confinement changes the recalcitrant contemnor's calculation and
may erode effective enforcement of plaintiffs' rights. The specified cap
allows a contemnor to decide to be confined for the specified time instead
of obeying.14 9 Confinement's ability to coerce diminishes as the end of the
specified time approaches. A specified time diminishes likelihood that a
contemnor will obey within the time.'5 0
The federal recalcitrant witness statute, passed as part of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, limits coercive confinement to eighteen months.'
The reasoning for choosing a fixed period seems to be that potentially
indefinite coercive confinement without criminal procedural protection is
potentially arbitrary and harsh and perhaps futile. The fixed period diminishes the likelihood that contemnors will be punished with disguised coercion
and without criminal due process.

145. See Harmer, supra note 2, at 268; Lewis, The Limits of Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22,
1988, at 23, col 1; D. Rendleman, Cruelty Begins Enough is Enbugh: Set Dr. Morgan Free,
Legal Times, Sept. 12, 1988, at 19.
146. Harmer, supra note 2, at 249-54.
147. P~nnTmoR REPoRT, supra note 35, at 172.
148. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 n.6 (1966).
149. See Czarra v. Czarra, 124 MI1.
App. 622, 624 (1906).
150. See Note, Coercive Contempt and the FederalGrand Jury, 79 CoLum. L. REv. 735,
765 (1979) (discussing effect of fixed maximum confinement period on contemnor).
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1988).
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A unified approach to the entire area of contempt may be desirable.5 2

A cap on coercive confinement is at the end of a detailed body of technical
contempt lore, built on a foundation that combines statutes and judicially
developed doctrine. A basic contempt statute usually exists.' A contempt
statute typically defines the misconduct that can be contempt and sets
criminal sanctions. Courts developed the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. ' 4 This distinction basically requires criminal procedure before
criminal punishment. Within civil contempt courts distinguish between compensatory and coercive contempt.'55 Criminal contempt follows criminal
procedure under the constitutional tests; but codification might establish
56
procedure to adjudicate coercive and compensatory contempts.
The legislature must choose between capping all coercive confinement
and capping only contempts before a particular court or in a particular
substantive area. The Wisconsin statute is general and covers all coercive
contempts.157 The federal recalcitrant witness statute governs only witnesses,
not all litigants.' 51 The District of Columbia legislation was limited to
59
contempts in child custody disputes.
A cap may be limited to a particular abuse like child custody, but it
need not be limited; perhaps the wiser route is to deal with specific instances
as part of the general problem. In my view, a uniform cap for all coercive
contempts is more salutary. The next controversial coercive imprisonment
might affect a reporter claiming a source privilege or a labor union officer.
Moreover the experience under the recalcitrant witness statute means that
Congress or a state legislature would be safe in using that statute as a

152. See Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 785 (West 1989) (codifying contempt powers of court);
Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal
Contempt, 50 U. CiN. L. Rnv. 677, 687-705 (1981) (discussing comprehensive treatment of
contempt in Wisconsin statutory scheme).
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) (allowing court to punish contempt at its discretion).
154. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-44 (1911).
155. See generally 10 LmATION 23 (1983).
156. See Note, supra note 150, at 742-44, 746-64 (discussing procedural safeguards
attaching to contempt action).
Professor Apel, to support the argument for augmented procedural protection in coercive
contempt, says that civil contempt is really criminal contempt, the civil-criminal distinction is
a legal fiction, and coercive confinement cannot be distinguished from criminal punishment.
Apel, supra note 24, at 523. The position taken here is that courts and legislatures should
develop separate procedures for compensatory, coercive, and criminal contempt. The argument
for abolishing the civil-criminal distinction ignores compensatory contempt completely. Private
plaintiffs and law enforcement officials need compensatory and coercive contempt procedures
to make court orders effective; compensatory and coercive contempt usually proceeds through
measures short of confinement; and even if defendant is confined, obedience normally opens
the jail door.
157. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 785.01 (West 1989) (defining contempt as any misconduct,
disobedience, or refusal, to obey).
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1988).
159. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-944(b) (Supp. 1990).
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precedent to cap all coercive confinement, broadening the recalcitrant witness
16
statute beyond witnesses to all coercive contemnors. 0
Once a legislature has decided how broadly a statutory cap on coercive
confinement should be applied, it needs to decide what the ceiling of the
statutory cap should be. The recalcitrant witness statute's eighteen month
period is not magic. We perforce lack experimental data on how long it
takes to coerce obedience and when confinement loses coercive force.
Congress appears to have chosen that yardstick because, when the Supreme
Court decided Shillitani, eighteen months was the maximum length of a
grand jury. Later Congressional debate has focused on whether eighteen
months is too lengthy and whether to bar successive contempts before
subsequent grand juries. In the vernacular of professional thinking, most
threats to confine will be effective if the contemnor thinks that confinement
will follow disobedience.16' An eighteen month period of potential confinement is substantial and induces obedience; but twelve or six months as in
the California and Wisconsin statutes would not hamper enforcement and
judicial credibility. 62 Congress's choice of eighteen months for a statute
dealing with organized crime may be longer than necessary; perhaps six or
twelve months is a better approach. If the recalcitrant witness statute's cap
of eighteen months on confinement suffices to coerce alleged participants
in organized crime, a shorter cap period may be appropriate when "contemnor's reasons to disobey are different-perhaps even better. 63
Another way to regulate the duration of coercive confinement is to end
coercive confinement after six months unless the contempt is renewed by a
panel of three trial judges. The second panel may or may not include the
original trial judge, although the writer favors excluding the original judge.
This proposal provides a balanced, deliberative, and collegial prediction of
whether continued confinement will coerce. At six months, the decision
occurs when re-examination is in order.
160. See H.R. 2136, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 CONG REc. H1427 (1989); S. 1163, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess. 135 CoNG. REc. S6532 (1989) (limiting period of confinement in civil contempt
cases). General H.R. 2136, which applied to all "civil contempt pursuant to the contempt
power" was preferable, in my view, to S. 1163 which was specifically targeted to contempt
involving custody of a minor child; the Elizabeth Morgan bill was just that, a sunset statute
too narrowly drawn for other condemners.
161. See Harmer, supra note 2, at 274 (citing S. REP. No. 104, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 3
(1989)).
162. See Note, supra note 150, at 765-72; Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966)
(determining that district courts lack authority to imprison contemnors for longer than the
term of the grand jury).
163. See Pub. L. No. 101-97, 103 Stat. 633 (1989) (limiting incarceration for civil contempt
in child custody case to twelve months and requiring studies of civil contempt procedures in
United States and D.C. courts); D.C. CoDE Ar. § 11-944(b) (Supp. 1990) 0imiting civil
contempt confinement to one year in child custody cases); see also PHmLoIMRE REPoRT, supra
note 35, at 201 (recommending limiting both criminal and coercive contempt to two years).
The Phillimore report cap became law in the United Kingdom. See Chesterman & Waters,
supra note 5, at 135 (following Phillimore Report and recommending two year cap on coercive
confinement for Australian courts).
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If the legislature limits coercive confinement, shbuld a judge ever release
a terminally stubborn contemnor as uncoercible before the limited time
expires?'6 A trial judge has considerable discretion about coercive tactics.
A judge can end coercion if the need to coerce ceases or if nothing remains
to coerce. In addition, a judge should release a contemnor when obedience
is impossible, no matter when he reaches that conclusion.
One federal judge administering witnesses' capped coercive confinement
let contemnors prove that they were uncoercible and should be released. 165
Some federal appellate court judges appear to assume in developing a
standard of review that, if the legislature has limited confinement and set
'the point at which coercion becomes punishment at eighteen months (a
reasonable point) courts should respect that statutory maximum.'6 This
leads to the deferential review for abuse of discretion. 67 Under that standard,
an appellate court found no abuse of discretion when a trial judge released
a contemnor after seven months, eleven months short of the cap.1es
The last judicial word on how a statutory cap affects the common law
doctrine of releasing uncoercible contemnors occurred in an uncapped
confinement, the final Morgan appeal. The trial judge decided to continue
confinement, but the appellate majority developed a way to articulate its
decision to reverse. It said the deferential appellate standards of review used
to administer capped confinement existed because the legislation created a
"presumption" that coercive confinement less than the statutory period did
not deny due process. A more intrusive standard of reviehf was appropriate
to administer potentially unlimited confinement because fhe question of
coercive-versus punitive confinement raised due process issues. The appellate
court should reverse if the trial court's decision was "clearly erroneous" or
"unsupported." Wielding that standard of review, the appellate court
69
discovered unsupported findings.
Will the judiciary retain the ability to release uncoercible contemnors if
the legislature passes a statutory cap? Sterile and soporific as the debate
about standard of review is, it is the closest we have to a judicial answer.
In the writer's view, the statute capping coercive confinement ought to
let a judge release an uncoercible contemnor any time. Even so, contemnors
will learn that firm legislative yardsticks garner judicial respect. Before the
statutory period has expired, a judge ought to be reluctant to conclude that

164. See Phillimore Report, supra note 35, at 201 (recommending fixed two year term
of coercive confinement qualified by power to review and to release before the full sentence
is served).
165. See In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857, 864-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating that, in the teeth
of eighteen month cap, six months seemed to be enough).
166. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 725 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984); Simkin v. United
States, 715 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420,
427, n.26 (3d Cir. 1979).
167. See supra note 166.
168. See In re Parrish, 782 F.2d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 1986).
169. Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. App. 1989).
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confinement has lost coercive force. 7 0 Appellate courts search for ways to
give trial judges free rein; and a statutory cap will probably furnish a
reason.
Any proposal for a statutory cap should address the fact that in
exacerbated cases, unsuccessful coercive confinement has been followed by
criminal contempt prosecution. 17 1 One alternative is for a statute to cap
coercive confinement at six or more months, but to allow additional criminal
imprisonment following criminal procedure. One proposal limited confinement to twelve months, but let the authorities follow that with criminal
contempt after a quick trial, a right to a jury, and a trial before a different
judge. 7 2 Proof of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt is implicit
in the proposal. The transition from coercive to criminal contempt should
be easy to understand and operate or the authorities will not use it.'73
A Columbia law review note suggested a hybrid coercive-criminal proposal which began with criminal procedure. This could lead to a period in
which the contemnor could comply followed by a definite criminal sentence:
"you have one week to obey; and if you don't, you are sentenced to six
months."' 74 The writer prefers a procedure to conduct coercive contempt
as civil and follow coercive confinement with a criminal contempt trial
before the fixed confinement period ends.
An expedited appeal from both a trial judge's initial order of coercive
.confinement and his decision that a contemnor is or is not uncoercible is
salutary. For both the contemnor and the plaintiff, time is a perishable
commodity and delay equals denial. An appeal will brand an imprimatur
of vindication on correct contempts; it will promptly release a citizen who
is improperly confined; and it provides what may be the first external check
on the trial judge's power.
170. See In re Howald, 877 F.2d 849, 850 (lth Cir. 1989); In re Credito, 759 F.2d 589,
591 (7th Cir. 1985); Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Grand
Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 1979).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 566 F.2d 402, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Berardelli, 565 F.2d,34 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 384,
392-92 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. De Simone, 267 F.2d 741, 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 827 (1959); Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 12 (D.C. App. 1989) (dicta); In re
Farr, 64 Cal. App. 3d 605, 614, 134 Cal. Rptr. 595, 600 (1976); 0. Fiss & D. RENDuLMA,
supra note 1, at 1106. Accord, United States v. Esposito, 633 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
In Eaposito, after two unsuccessful coercive confinements, contemnor was released as
terminally stubborn only to be indicted for criminal contempt. He moved to dismiss arguing
that repetitive contempt denies due process. The court decided that a civil contempt sentence
does not bar a criminal prosecution. Id. at 545. While inability to coerce contemnor does not
bar punishment, the judge may consider his fear of reprisal in setting the criminal sentence.
In a footnote the judge noted that: 1) successive civil coercive contempt may infringe due
process, 2) multiple criminal contempt may infringe due process, and 3) double jeopardy bars
successive criminal prosecutions. Id. at 545 n.1.
172. See H.R. 2136, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CoNa. REc. H1427 (1989) (providing for
criminal contempt after limited civil contempt period).
173. See S. REP. No. 104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989) (portion from Rendleman's
testimony).
174. See Note, supra note 154, at 772-73.
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The federal recalcitrant witness statute tells the appellate court that
appeals "shall be disposed of as soon as practicable, but not later than
thirty days from the filing of the appeal.117 From the point of view of
someone wrongfully imprisoned, the requirement that the appellate court
dispose of the appeal in thirty days is far better than the proposal that the
appeal be heard in sixty days. 176 New legislation might, consistent with the
recalcitrant witness statute, provide for more expedited appeals on trial
judges' decisions to confine and to continue to confine.
Coercive contempt is a crucial judicial tool with an awesome potential
for abuse. Accommodating effective and positive government with individual
liberties is a crucial legislative function. A statutory cap that terminates
confinement after a certain time is an appropriate way to limit coercive
confinement.
CONCLUSION

When judges confine to coerce compliance, a terminally stubborn contemnor may break the boundary between remedy and right. After testing
the contemnor, the judicial system has usually found some way to release
her. If the judge determines that the obdurate contenmor is uncoercible,
the coercive contempt is transmogrified into criminal contempt imposed
without criminal process and the contemnor is released.
This article responds to two broader critical questions. What kind of
remedial pragmatism do you propose that stops short of tailoring plaintiff's
remedy to his substantive entitlement and leaves a winning litigant out of
his rightful position? Why have court decisions and statutes that incorporate
disobedience into "enforcement" and allow it to prevail over substantive
justice?
My answers are shaped by my views of human cussedness, judicial
fallibility, and governmental inability to solve all problems, as wel as the
tendency of crisis to careen out of control in unpredictable directions.
Deciding lawsuits is imperfect. Error may occur. Moreover, there are
limits on what courts can do, even for the impeccable claimant. At the
center of our system of limited government and separated power is a dislike
of unchecked power and a fear that it may be exercised in a harsh and
arbitrary way. Our system respects individual autonomy, and at some point,
it is willing to subordinate plaintiff's and the adjudicative system's interests.
Complex legal systems do not have many unqualified substantive rights.'7
Substantive rights are often stated as principled goals. The remedial stage
often requires additional adaption, compromise, and mid-course 1correction,
78
"the art of the possible in striving to attain" substantive rights.

175. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) (1988).

176. See S. 1163, 101st Cong. 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S6532 (1989).
177. See A. BIcKEL, THE MoRA=iY OF CONSENT 88 (1975).
178. Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HAgv. L. REv. 40, 50 (1961).
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Even when the contemnor creates the crisis by recalcitrance, flexibility
overcomes doctrinal absolutes. The terminal stubbornness doctrine means
that judges lack an effective way of keeping their promises. 179 Because of
human fallibility in the decisionmaking process, that is just as well. Burning
bridges is usually a mistake. Sometimes judges "have to accept that the
enforcement of a particular ... order in accordance with its literal terms
80
is a practical impossibility."'
Under the skeptical view of government power taken here, winners of
lawsuits may have to be content with the least bad solution. So Judge Row
may respond to Cora's terminal stubbornness by releasing her and either
moving forward with criminal contempt or letting her determine whether
Frank can visit Heather. In a world of lesser evils, Cora's decision to bar
Frank from custody may be less undesirable than continuing, perhaps
indefimitely, to confine Cora.'
Finally, has our perspective on conflict and disobedience been clouded
by hierarchy, formal government, and traditional views of winning and
losing? The transition from coercive to criminal contempt was not the only
metamorphosis that occurred during Elizabeth Morgan's confinement: passivity became action, powerlessness became power, and, eventually, losing
became winning. Witness the parallel events of the same years, 1987-1990,
that brought Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia and Nelson Mandela in South
Africa from prison to prominence, even to formal "power." Skepticism
about short-term victory and defeat is propitious at a university named for
two earlier civil disobedients.

179. T. ScHmEUNO, supra note 29, at 24-28.
180. Chesterman & Waters, supra note 5, at 123.

181. See Apel, supra note 24, at 527.

